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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
DAVID TOMPKINS, an individual, on behalf of 
himself and others similarly situated, 
 
                                      Plaintiffs, 
 v. 
 
23ANDME, INC., 
 
                                      Defendant.                      
) 
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) 
Case No.:  5:13-CV-05682-LHK 
 
Consolidated and Related Cases:  
5:14-CV-00294-LHK 
5:14-CV-00429-LHK 
5:14-CV-01167-LHK 
5:14-CV-01191-LHK 
5:14-CV-01258-LHK 
5:14-CV-01348-LHK 
5:14-CV-01455-LHK 
 
ORDER GRANTING OMNIBUS 
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION  
 
  
 This case involves putative class action claims related to Defendant 23andMe, Inc.’s 
(“23andMe”) advertising and marketing of its Personal Genome Service.  23andMe filed an 
Omnibus Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Alternatively Stay the Action in Favor 
of Arbitration.  ECF Nos. 69, 69-1 (“Mot.”).  Plaintiffs oppose the Motion.  ECF No. 103 
(“Opp’n”).  23andMe filed a Reply in support of the Motion.  ECF No. 104 (“Reply”).  
 Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court found this matter appropriate for 
resolution without a hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).  Because the Court determines 
that Plaintiffs’ claims must be arbitrated, the Court hereby GRANTS 23andMe’s motion to compel 
arbitration and DISMISSES all of Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Allegations 
 1.  Personal Genome Service (“PGS”) and the FDA Warning Letter 
23andMe is a personal genetics company founded in 2006 that offers to provide customers 
hereditary information from a genetic sample.  See ECF No. 23-1.  The product at issue in the 
instant case is 23andMe’s Personal Genome Service (“PGS”).  PGS is a service that consists of a 
DNA saliva collection kit (“DNA kit”) and DNA test results with certain genetic information 
derived from a customer’s saliva sample.  To use PGS, customers first purchase DNA kits online at 
23andMe’s website, http://www.23andMe.com.1  The price of a DNA kit is currently $99, not 
including shipping fees.  Upon purchase, 23andMe ships the DNA kit to the customer with a pre-
addressed return box and instructions on how to return a saliva sample to 23andMe.  Id.  23andMe 
then receives the saliva sample and has the DNA tested at a certified laboratory.  When 23andMe 
receives the DNA results from the laboratory, 23andMe posts the customer’s DNA information 
online to the customer’s personal genome profile.  The customer receives an e-mail notification 
when DNA results are ready to view.  Id.  
The DNA results from PGS have had two components: the health component and the 
ancestry component.  ECF No. 23-8.  The health component informs customers about how their 
genetics impact their health by providing data on health risks, inherited conditions, drug responses, 
and genetic traits.  Id.  The ancestry component offers a variety of features such as tracing ancestry 
and identifying relatives, including a DNA comparison to other 23andMe users.  Id.  
                                                          
1  The parties do not dispute that the key portions of the website have not changed since the 
relevant times when Plaintiffs allegedly performed the transactions at issue.  23andMe relies on 
excerpts from a February 2014 version of the website (see ECF No. 70-9), while Plaintiffs use 
excerpts dated April 2014 (see ECF No. 103-2).  However, the Court takes judicial notice of the 
Internet Archive (http://archive.org) version of 23andMe’s website as of November 20, 2013, the 
full version of the website archived right before the FDA warning letter of November 22, 2013 
(discussed below).  The Court applies the doctrine of incorporation by reference to the instant case.  
See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[D]ocuments whose contents are alleged 
in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to 
the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”); see also Knievel 
v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of linked webpages because 
“a computer user necessarily views web pages in the context of the links through which the user 
accessed those pages”). 
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 On November 22, 2013, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) sent a “Warning 
Letter” to 23andMe.  ECF No. 103-2.  The letter informed 23andMe that the company was 
violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act by selling PGS without marketing clearance or 
approval.  The FDA detailed a number of concerns with the health component of PGS.  The letter 
further noted that 23andMe had expanded the uses of PGS beyond those submitted to the FDA and 
broadened its marketing campaigns without FDA authorization.  Id.  The FDA required 23andMe 
to discontinue marketing PGS until 23andMe received marketing clearance and approval for the 
product.  Id.  On December 6, 2013, 23andMe stopped offering the health component of PGS to 
new customers.  See Tompkins Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 1.  The FDA allowed 23andMe to continue 
to provide new customers with the ancestry component of PGS in addition to raw genetic data.  See 
Mot. at 2.  Customers who purchased PGS before November 22, 2013 could receive their initial 
health results without updates.  Id. at 3.  According to the company’s website, 23andMe now 
provides full refunds to anyone who purchased a DNA kit between November 22, 2013 and 
December 5, 2013.  
  2. 23andMe’s Terms of Service 
The present dispute about arbitration of the Plaintiffs’ claims turns on a purported 
agreement between the parties.  The last section of 23andMe’s online Terms of Service (“TOS”) is 
a “Miscellaneous” section numbered 28.  Section 28b of this Miscellaneous section is an arbitration 
provision that reads as follows: 
 
Applicable law and arbitration. Except for any disputes relating to intellectual 
property rights, obligations, or any infringement claims, any disputes with 23andMe 
arising out of or relating to the Agreement (“Disputes”) shall be governed by 
California law regardless of your country of origin or where you access 23andMe, 
and notwithstanding of any conflicts of law principles and the United Nations 
Convention for the International Sale of Goods. Any Disputes shall be resolved by 
final and binding arbitration under the rules and auspices of the American 
Arbitration Association, to be held in San Francisco, California, in English, with a 
written decision stating legal reasoning issued by the arbitrator(s) at either party’s 
request, and with arbitration costs and reasonable documented attorneys’ costs of 
both parties to be borne by the party that ultimately loses. Either party may obtain 
injunctive relief (preliminary or permanent) and orders to compel arbitration or 
enforce arbitral awards in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
ECF No. 70-10 § 28b (the “arbitration provision”).  At all relevant times, the TOS have been 
accessible via hyperlink at the bottom of 23andMe’s homepage under the heading “LEGAL.”  ECF 
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No. 22-3.  The user must scroll through a significant amount of information to view the TOS 
hyperlink at the bottom of the homepage.  Other pages such as “Refund Policy” and “Privacy 
Policy” also include the TOS hyperlink, but reference to the TOS never appears in the text, sidebar, 
or at the top of the webpage prior to purchase of a DNA kit.  The TOS hyperlink appears at the 
bottom of many, but not all, of 23andMe’s website pages.  The words always appear in standard 
font size, in blue or gray font, on a white background.  
When customers buy and obtain PGS, they perform two steps on 23andMe’s website.  First, 
a customer must order and pay for a DNA kit.  The ordering webpage has no requirement that 
customers view the TOS or click to accept the TOS.  In other words, customers can enter their 
payment information and purchase DNA kits online without seeing the TOS.  See Opp’n at 4.  The 
only opportunity for a full refund is a 60-minute cancellation window after purchase.  See ECF 
103-2 Ex. 4 (“The cancellation option is available for 60 minutes after you place your order from 
both the order confirmation page and the order confirmation email.”).  Customers can receive 
partial refunds within 30 days of purchase, provided they have not already sent their saliva to the 
laboratory.  Id.  Customers have 12 months from the date of purchase to use the DNA kit.   
Second, after purchase of a DNA kit, in order to send in a DNA sample to the laboratory 
and receive genetic information, customers must both create accounts and register their DNA kits 
online.  See Hillyer Decl. (ECF No. 71) ¶ 3.  The account creation page requires customers to 
check a box next to the line, “Yes, I have read and agree to the Terms of Service and Privacy 
Statement.”  The TOS and Privacy Statement appear in blue font and are hyperlinks to the full 
terms:  
Hillyer Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.   
Similarly, during the registration process, customers must view a page with the title “To 
continue, accept our terms of service” written in large font at the top of the page.  The registration 
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page provides a hyperlink to the full TOS next to the line: “When you sign up for 23andMe’s 
service you agree to our Terms of Service. Click here to read our full Terms of Service.”  
Customers must then click a large blue icon that reads “I ACCEPT THE TERMS OF SERVICE” 
before finishing the registration process and receiving their DNA information:  
Hillyer Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B.  As explained below, all named Plaintiffs in the instant action created 
accounts and registered their DNA kits online.  See ECF No. 105 ¶ 2.  However, it is possible for a 
customer to buy a DNA kit, for example, as a gift for someone else, so that the purchasing 
customer never needs to create an account or register the kit, and thus is never asked to 
acknowledge the TOS. 
B. Procedural History 
Following the FDA letter, between November 27, 2013 and March 27, 2014, multiple 
Plaintiffs filed class action complaints against 23andMe across several venues, alleging a variety of 
claims related to false advertising, unfair competition, and consumer protection.  All pending 
litigations in federal district courts have been transferred to this Court and consolidated for pretrial 
purposes.  See ECF Nos. 28, 33, 45 (orders consolidating cases).  Additionally, according to the 
parties, there are at least three arbitrations pending before the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) involving class claims.  See ECF No. 53 at 8 (listing proceedings); Mot. at 4.   
On February 25, 2014, in the case involving Plaintiff David Tompkins (No. 13-CV-05682), 
23andMe moved to compel arbitration.  ECF No. 20.  The parties agreed to postpone briefing and 
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resolution of that motion pending transfer and consolidation of the other co-pending litigations.  
ECF No. 25.  23andMe subsequently withdrew its initial motion regarding arbitration and, on April 
28, 2014, filed the current “omnibus” motion to compel all Plaintiffs to arbitrate all claims.  ECF 
No. 69.  On May 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition.  ECF No. 103.  On June 4, 2014, 
23andMe filed a reply.  ECF No. 104.  Additionally, following briefing and argument, the Court 
appointed interim class counsel on May 14, 2014.  ECF No. 100.   
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A.  Federal Arbitration Act 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to arbitration agreements in any contract 
affecting interstate commerce.  See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001); 9 
U.S.C. § 2.  Enacted for the purpose of making valid and enforceable written agreements to 
arbitrate disputes, the FAA embodies “the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not 
coercion.’”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010) (quoting 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).  In 
accordance with this principle, the Supreme Court has held that parties may agree to limit the 
issues subject to arbitration, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985); to arbitrate according to specific rules, Volt, 489 U.S. at 479; and to limit with 
whom a party will arbitrate its disputes, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773.  Section 4 of the FAA 
ensures that “‘private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms,’” id. (quoting 
Volt, 489 U.S. at 479), by expressly authorizing a party to an arbitration agreement to petition a 
U.S. District Court for an order directing that “arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
such agreement,” 9 U.S.C. § 4.  In addition, the FAA contains a mandatory stay provision.  Id. § 3.  
Under the FAA, arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA places arbitration agreements “on an equal footing 
with other contracts.”  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).  The 
interpretation of an arbitration agreement is therefore generally a matter of state law, see Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901-02 (2009), unless application of state-law rules 
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would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives,” AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
 B. Arbitrability  
Parties can agree to delegate arbitrability—or “gateway” issues concerning the scope and 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, and whether the dispute should go to arbitration at all—
to the arbitrator.  The Supreme Court has held that the question of “who has the power to decide 
arbitrability,” the court or the arbitrator, “turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter.”  
First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (emphasis in original).  “An 
agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party 
seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional 
arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.”  Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 70.  The Supreme 
Court recognizes a heightened standard for an arbitrator to decide arbitrability issues.  See AT&T 
Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (“Unless the parties clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be 
decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”); Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944 (“Courts should not assume that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that 
they did so.”).  Rent-A-Center acknowledges that while courts may consider enforceability 
challenges that are specific to the delegation clause in an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator is to 
consider challenges to the arbitration agreement as a whole.  561 U.S. at 73.  In cases where the 
parties “clearly and unmistakably intend to delegate the power to decide arbitrability to an 
arbitrator,” the Court’s inquiry is “limited . . . [to] whether the assertion of arbitrability is ‘wholly 
groundless.’”  Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying 
Ninth Circuit law). 
 C. Unconscionability 
When evaluating defenses to arbitration agreements, such as unconscionability, courts 
generally apply state contract law.  See Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1901-02; 9 U.S.C. § 2.  In 
this case, California law governs 23andMe’s arbitration agreement.  See TOS § 28b (“any disputes 
. . . shall be governed by California law”).  Under California law, “unconscionability has both a 
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‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element.”  Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 
Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000) (citation omitted).  California courts have explained the interplay between 
procedural and substantive unconscionability as follows:  
 
The procedural component focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise.  
Oppression results where there is no real negotiation of contract terms because of 
unequal bargaining power.  “Surprise” involves the extent to which the supposedly 
agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the 
party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.  The substantive component of 
unconscionability looks to whether the contract allocates the risks of the bargain in 
an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.  To be unenforceable there must 
be both substantive and procedural unconscionability, though there may be an 
inverse relation between the two elements. 
Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 1664 (1993) (citations omitted).   
III. DISCUSSION 
The parties dispute several issues regarding the TOS.  The Court addresses these in turn, 
starting with whether a contract between the parties exists at all. 
A.  Existence of Agreement 
 Plaintiffs contend that there is no valid arbitration agreement because (1) they did not agree 
to the TOS when they purchased the DNA kits, and (2) they received no consideration for agreeing 
to the TOS when they subsequently created accounts or registered their kits.  See Opp’n at 14-16.  
23andMe responds that the TOS are valid and enforceable clickwrap agreements that each named 
Plaintiff accepted by clicking a box or button on the website.  See Reply at 13-15.  The Court 
agrees with Plaintiffs that they did not agree to the TOS at the purchasing stage, but agrees with 
23andMe that the TOS took effect upon account creation and/or registration. 
  1. Agreement Upon Purchase 
 Plaintiffs first argue that they never agreed to the TOS when they purchased PGS.  As 
explained above, Plaintiffs’ reference to the “PGS” conflates two items: the physical DNA kits and 
the subsequent provision of genetic information.  Customers perform a bifurcated transaction in 
which they purchase the DNA kit online, and then obtain hereditary data after creating an account, 
registering the kit, and submitting a saliva sample.  Here, Plaintiffs contend that 23andMe did not 
provide the TOS “as part of the checkout process” (Opp’n at 16), which implicates the step of 
buying the DNA kits.  The Court agrees that the TOS were not effective upon purchase of the kits. 
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 The existence of an agreement between 23andMe and its customers implicates the law of 
Internet-based contract formation.  An increasing number of courts and commentators have 
addressed the circumstances under which parties may form contracts online.  In particular, 
“shrinkwrap,” “clickwrap,” and “browsewrap” agreements are relevant here.  A shrinkwrap 
agreement generally refers to a situation where a customer buys and receives a product, the written 
agreement is presented with the product after purchase, and the customer implicitly accepts by 
opening and keeping the product.  See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d 
Cir. 2002).  A clickwrap agreement “presents the user with a message on his or her computer 
screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by 
clicking on an icon.”  Id. at 22 n.4 (quotation and citation omitted).  By contrast, as this Court 
recently explained:  
 
Browsewrap agreements are those that purport to bind the users of websites to 
which the agreements are hyperlinked. Generally, the text of the agreement is found 
on a separate webpage hyperlinked to the website the user is accessing. The 
browsewrap agreements are generally entitled “Terms of Use” or “Terms of 
Service.” The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that the user can 
continue to use the website or its services without visiting the page hosting the 
browsewrap agreement or even knowing that such a webpage exists. 
Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147047, at *23 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 9, 2013).  Courts have enforced certain clickwrap and browsewrap agreements, 
depending on the nature of the parties, type of notice provided, and other factors.  See generally 
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 459-60 (2006).  In general, courts enforce 
inconspicuous browsewrap agreements only when there is evidence that the user has actual or 
constructive notice of the site’s terms.  See Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-
0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); see also Lemley, supra, at 477 (“Courts 
may be willing to overlook the utter absence of assent only when there are reasons to believe that 
the defendant is aware of the plaintiff’s terms.”). 
 Here, at the purchase stage, the TOS on 23andMe’s website closely resembled a 
browsewrap agreement and provided insufficient notice to customers who bought DNA kits.  There 
is no dispute that 23andMe’s website did not require customers to acknowledge the TOS during 
purchase.  23andMe does not specifically argue that Plaintiffs accepted the TOS upon purchasing 
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the kits, but does argue that it was “impossible to register for and receive the Service without 
clicking ‘I ACCEPT’ to the TOS.”  Reply at 15.  However, 23andMe uses the term “Service” 
ambiguously in its briefs and in the TOS.  The TOS provides the following definition:  
 
“Service” or “Services” means 23andMe’s products, software, services, and website 
(including but not limited to text, graphics, images, and other material and 
information) as accessed from time to time by the user, regardless if the use is in 
connection with an account or not. 
TOS § 1 (emphases added).  The TOS also states: “You can accept the TOS by . . . actually using 
the Services.”  Id. § 2 (emphasis added).  Thus, according to the plain language of the TOS, a 
customer accepted the terms merely by using a product (such as the DNA kit) or visiting the 
website, even without creating an account.  As a result, 23andMe’s contention in its Reply that it 
was “impossible to . . . receive the Service without clicking ‘I ACCEPT’” (italics added) is 
misleading. 
 23andMe cannot rely on purported acceptance of the TOS upon purchase to demonstrate a 
valid agreement.  As explained above, during checkout, the website did not present or require 
acceptance of the TOS.  Rather, the only way for a customer to see the TOS at that stage was to 
scroll to the very bottom of the page and click a link under the heading “LEGAL.”  See Hillyer 
Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C.  Such an arrangement provided insufficient notice to customers and website 
visitors.  For example, in Be In, this Court held that “mere use of a website” could not demonstrate 
users’ assent, and that the “mere existence of a link” failed to notify users of terms of service.  
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147047, at *33.  Other courts have held that similar browsewrap-style 
agreements are ineffective.  E.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 20, 32 (finding that a “reasonably prudent 
Internet user” would not have seen “a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged 
screen”); Jerez v. JD Closeouts, LLC, 943 N.Y.S.2d 392, 398 (Dist. Ct. 2012) (“[E]-commerce 
merchants cannot blithely assume that the inclusion of sale terms, listed somewhere on a 
hyperlinked page on its website, will be deemed part of any contract of sale.”); Hines v. 
Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 
2010) (holding online retail store did not provide adequate notice when the website did not prompt 
customer to review the site’s “Terms and Conditions” and the link to the terms was not 
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prominently displayed).  23andMe’s customers may have been unfamiliar with the website, and the 
website’s layout never directed customers to view the TOS prior to purchase.  Thus there is no 
evidence that Plaintiffs had or should have had knowledge of the TOS when they purchased their 
DNA kits online. 
 Accordingly, 23andMe’s TOS would have been ineffective to bind website visitors or 
customers who only purchased a DNA kit without creating an account or registering a kit.  The 
Court finds that 23andMe’s practice of obscuring terms of service until after purchase—and for a 
potentially indefinite time—is unfair, and that a better practice would be to show or require 
acknowledgement of such terms at the point of sale. 
  2. Post-Purchase Agreement 
 Plaintiffs next argue that any acceptance of the TOS after the purchasing stage was also 
ineffective for multiple reasons.  The Court addresses each of these arguments. 
 Initially, Plaintiffs imply that none of the named Plaintiffs ever clicked “I ACCEPT” to the 
TOS, claiming that “23andMe has not submitted competent evidence that plaintiffs ever agreed to 
the Terms of Service.”  Opp’n at 16.  This argument is unavailing.  Plaintiffs rely on Comb v. 
PayPal, Inc., but in that case, the parties disputed whether the relevant agreement contained an 
arbitration provision at certain times, which is not at issue here.  218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171-72 
(N.D. Cal. 2002).  Plaintiffs do not dispute that the 23andMe website requires each person who 
creates an account or registers a kit to indicate acceptance of the TOS before receiving any test 
results, nor do Plaintiffs dispute that the TOS contained the same arbitration provision at all 
relevant times.  Various Plaintiffs have alleged that they received test results after purchasing kits.  
See, e.g., Tompkins Compl. ¶ 15; Dilger Decl. (ECF No. 103-3) ¶¶ 5-6.  Thus, these Plaintiffs must 
have clicked “I ACCEPT THE TERMS OF SERVICE” when creating an account and registering.  
Plaintiffs also submit a declaration from named Plaintiff Vernon Stanton stating that he in fact 
agreed to the TOS.  See Stanton Decl. (ECF No. 103-4) ¶¶ 4-5.  Moreover, 23andMe has submitted 
records with its Reply showing that each named Plaintiff created an account and registered a kit.  
See Hillyer Supp. Decl. (ECF No. 105) ¶ 2, Exs. A-M; Reply at 14 n.20.  Other courts have found 
that user access to portions of websites that require indicating assent to be sufficient evidence that 
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the user clicked “I Accept.”  See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (“Clicking ‘Continue’ without clicking the ‘Yes’ button would have returned the user to the 
same webpage. If the user did not agree to all of the terms, he could not have activated his account, 
placed ads, or incurred charges.”).  Thus, Plaintiffs cannot credibly claim ignorance as to whether 
they actually clicked the appropriate checkboxes. 
 Next, Plaintiffs argue that any post-purchase acceptance of the TOS (during account 
creation or registration) was ineffective because customers had by then already paid for the DNA 
kits and received no additional consideration for accepting the TOS.  See Opp’n at 17.  Plaintiffs 
contend that the TOS was either a clickwrap agreement that lacked adequate consideration, or a 
shrinkwrap agreement that provided “no adequate right to return the product.”  Id.  23andMe 
responds that customers received adequate consideration in the form of 23andMe’s agreement to 
arbitrate and certain intellectual property concessions.  See Reply at 14-15.  The parties also 
disagree as to whether post-purchase agreement to the TOS constituted a clickwrap or browsewrap 
agreement, as courts have tended to enforce the former but not the latter.  Compare Opp’n at 17 
with Reply at 15; see also Lemley, supra, at 459-60. 
 The Court concludes that there was adequate consideration for customers’ acceptance of the 
TOS post-purchase.  Under California contract law (which governs under the TOS and is not 
disputed by the parties), “[a] written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration,” Cal. 
Civ. Code § 1614, and “all the law requires for sufficient consideration is the proverbial 
‘peppercorn,’” San Diego City Firefighters, Local 145 v. Bd. of Admin., 206 Cal. App. 4th 594, 619 
(2012).  The Ninth Circuit has held, in the employment context and under California law, that a 
“promise to be bound by the arbitration process itself serves as adequate consideration.”  Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).  Under this precedent, 23andMe’s 
agreement to accept arbitration provided acceptable consideration to its customers.  The TOS also 
provided certain rights to customers, such as a “limited license” to use 23andMe’s “Services” as 
defined in the agreement.  See TOS ¶ 9.  Furthermore, in exchange for clicking “I ACCEPT,” 
customers received the health and ancestry results from their DNA samples.  Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs received sufficient consideration for agreeing to the TOS. 
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 The Court also determines that Plaintiffs received adequate notice regarding the TOS.  As 
noted above, during the account creation and registration processes, each named Plaintiff clicked a 
box or button that appeared near a hyperlink to the TOS to indicate acceptance of the TOS.  In this 
respect, the TOS resemble clickwrap agreements, where an offeree receives an opportunity to 
review terms and conditions and must affirmatively indicate assent.  See Specht, 306 F.3d at 22 n.4.  
The fact that the TOS were hyperlinked and not presented on the same screen does not mean that 
customers lacked adequate notice.  For example, in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., the court dealt with a 
similar website agreement that required users to click “Sign Up” and presented only a link to the 
relevant terms and conditions.  841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  The court noted that 
the agreement possessed characteristics of both clickwrap and browsewrap agreements: “Thus 
Facebook’s Terms of Use are somewhat like a browsewrap agreement in that the terms are only 
visible via a hyperlink, but also somewhat like a clickwrap agreement in that the user must do 
something else—click ‘Sign Up’—to assent to the hyperlinked terms.  Yet, unlike some clickwrap 
agreements, the user can click to assent whether or not the user has been presented with the terms.”  
Id. at 838.  Nevertheless, Fteja concluded that the website provided adequate notice because courts 
have long upheld contracts where “the consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that are 
located somewhere else.”  Id. at 839; see also Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 
904, 911-12 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (enforcing arbitration clause where “Plaintiff was provided with an 
opportunity to review the terms of service in the form of a hyperlink immediately under the ‘I 
accept’ button”). 
 Plaintiffs’ analogy to a typical shrinkwrap agreement—and a supposed requirement to 
provide a full refund—is misplaced here.  Plaintiffs argue that the TOS resemble a shrinkwrap 
agreement because the customer received terms only after paying for the product.  In ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, one of the seminal cases on shrinkwrap contracts, the Seventh Circuit upheld such 
contracts in part because the customers there had “a right to return the software for a refund if the 
terms are unacceptable.”  86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).  Here, 23andMe’s Refund Policy was 
restrictive: customers could “cancel” (receive a full refund) only within 60 minutes of purchasing a 
DNA kit, and could obtain a partial refund “subtracting a) $25 per kit and b) your original shipping 
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and handling charges” only within 30 days of purchase and before the laboratory received a DNA 
sample.  ECF No. 103-2 Ex. 4.  However, the shrinkwrap analogy does not apply here because 
23andMe does not argue that the TOS took effect when customers failed to return the DNA kits 
after a certain period.  In typical shrinkwrap cases, the customer tacitly accepts contractual terms 
by not returning the product within a specified time.  E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding contract that became effective when customer did not return 
product within 30 days).  In this case, each named Plaintiff actually agreed to the TOS by affirming 
“I ACCEPT THE TERMS OF SERVICE,” not by keeping the DNA kit beyond a certain time.2  
Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument that 23andMe’s refund policy was too restrictive does not negate their 
affirmative assent to the TOS.  Certain named Plaintiffs claim not to remember seeing the TOS or 
Section 28b (the arbitration agreement).  See Stanton Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Dilger Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.  Even if 
true, that does not change the fact that they received adequate notice of the relevant terms and 
clicked the “I ACCEPT THE TERMS OF SERVICE” button.  See, e.g., Merkin v. Vonage Am. 
Inc., No. 2:13-cv-08026, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14055, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014) (“But 
plaintiffs’ failure of recollection as to whether or not they agreed to the TOS does not create a 
genuine dispute in light of Vonage’s evidence that agreeing to the TOS is required during the 
registration process.”).  Furthermore, California contract law is clear that “[a] party cannot avoid 
the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.”  Marin Storage 
& Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1049 (2001). 
 For the reasons above, the Court concludes that the named Plaintiffs accepted the TOS 
when they created accounts or registered their DNA kits, and rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that no 
arbitration agreements exist with 23andMe. 
B.  Arbitrability 
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provision in the TOS is unconscionable and cannot be 
enforced.  However, 23andMe contends that this Court cannot decide unconscionability because 
                                                          
2  The result may differ for putative unnamed plaintiffs who only purchased a DNA kit 
without creating an account or registering the product.  As noted above, any such customers were 
not required to accept the TOS, and did not otherwise receive adequate notice of the TOS, before 
giving 23andMe their money. 
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the arbitration provision delegates those issues to an arbitrator, such that questions of arbitrability 
must themselves be arbitrated.  See Mot. at 1-6.  The Court concludes that the arbitration provision 
fails to show that the parties clearly and unmistakably consented to delegate arbitrability, and that 
the Court must decide Plaintiffs’ unconscionability defense. 
 1.  Applicable Law 
 The parties dispute even the threshold question of what law applies to determine if 
questions of arbitrability must go to a court or an arbitrator.  Plaintiffs’ position is that California 
law applies to this issue because the arbitration provision says that “any disputes with 23andMe 
arising out of or relating to the Agreement (“Disputes”) shall be governed by California law.”  See 
Opp’n at 6 (emphasis in original).  23andMe responds that federal law applies because federal 
courts have resolved the issue of delegation of arbitrability without expressly relying on state law.  
See Reply at 1-2.   
 The Court concludes that the federal law of arbitrability applies in these circumstances.  
Interpretation of arbitration agreements generally turns on state law.  See Arthur Andersen, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1901-02.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “the first task of a court asked to 
compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute,” 
and that “[t]he court is to make this determination by applying the federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”  Mitsubishi, 
473 U.S. at 626.  In the Ninth Circuit, parties may agree “to have arbitrability governed by non-
federal arbitrability law,” but this requires “clear and unmistakable evidence” of the parties’ intent 
to do so.  Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, 647 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Courts should 
apply federal arbitrability law absent ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ that the parties agreed to 
apply non-federal arbitrability law.”).   
In this case, federal arbitrability law applies presumptively because the parties agree that 
the FAA covers the TOS arbitration provision.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (FAA applies to “a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce”).  The TOS arbitration provision does not clearly 
and unmistakably show that California law of arbitrability should apply because it states only that 
disputes “arising out of or relating to the Agreement” are governed by California law.  In Cape 
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Flattery, the Ninth Circuit held that nearly identical language—a provision that “[a]ny dispute 
arising under this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration . . . in accordance with the English 
Arbitration Act 1996”—was “ambiguous concerning whether English law also applies to determine 
whether a given dispute is arbitrable in the first place.”  647 F.3d at 921.  By the same token, the 
23andMe provision is similarly “ambiguous” because it does not expressly designate the law that 
governs arbitrability, and thus federal arbitrability law applies by default.3 
 2.  Incorporation of AAA Rules 
23andMe’s primary argument is that any challenges to the validity of the TOS arbitration 
provision—including Plaintiffs’ unconscionability theories—are questions that the parties 
delegated to an arbitrator, and not the courts.  23andMe bases this argument on the reference to the 
AAA rules in Section 28b (the arbitration provision) of the TOS. 
The TOS arbitration provision refers to the “rules and auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association.”  TOS § 28b.  However, there are multiple layers of ambiguity about which AAA 
rules govern.  The AAA maintains multiple sets of rules for different types of disputes, such as 
commercial, consumer, and employment.  See https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules.  Section 28b 
does not identify any of these specific rules.  Even 23andMe’s counsel is inconsistent about which 
AAA rules apply.  In its opening brief, 23andMe takes the position that the AAA Commercial 
Arbitration Rules apply to Plaintiffs’ claims.  See Mot. at 7 n.4.  However, in its Reply, 23andMe 
states that the Commercial Arbitration Rules would be “supplemented by the AAA’s 
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes.”  Reply at 3 n.4, 12.   
The AAA rules themselves indicate that one or more sets of rules may apply, at the AAA’s 
discretion.  Rule R-1(a) of the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 
                                                          
3  Additionally, the recent decision in Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 231 
(2014), suggests that arbitrability should be analyzed similarly under both California and federal 
law.  The California Court of Appeal addressed the issue of delegating arbitrability to the court or 
an arbitrator, and the question of whether state or federal law applies to that issue.  Id. at 239.  The 
court stated that “the FAA’s applicability is immaterial because our decision in this case would be 
the same under either the FAA or the CAA [California Arbitration Act],” and noted that California 
courts “have specifically looked to the FAA when considering delegation clauses and have long 
held that the rules governing these clauses are the same under both state and federal law.”  Id. at 
239-40 (citations omitted).   
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(“Commercial Rules”) states that the Commercial Rules apply when the parties refer generically to 
AAA rules but do not specify a particular ruleset:  
 
The parties shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration 
agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration by the American Arbitration 
Association (hereinafter AAA) under its Commercial Arbitration Rules or for 
arbitration by the AAA of a domestic commercial dispute without specifying 
particular rules. 
AAA, “Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures” at 10 (effective Oct. 1, 2013), 
available at: http://go.adr.org/LP=307.  However, Rule C-1(a) of the AAA’s Supplementary 
Procedures for the Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes (“Consumer Rules”) states that both 
the Commercial and Consumer Rules apply to “an agreement between a consumer and a business 
where the business has a standardized, systematic application of arbitration clauses with 
customers.”  AAA, “Supplementary Procedures for the Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes” 
at 8 (effective Mar. 1, 2013), available at: https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer.  
However, Rule C-1(a) further states that “[t]he AAA will have the discretion to apply or not to 
apply the Supplementary Procedures.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Accordingly, in the instant case, 
there are at least two ambiguities in the arbitration provision’s reference to the AAA rules: lack of 
identification of specific AAA rules, and uncertainty as to whether the Consumer Rules apply in 
addition to the Commercial Rules. 
Under the AAA’s Commercial Rules, Rule R-7(a) states that the arbitrator decides 
questions of arbitrability: “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own 
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the 
arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”  Id. at 13.  Based on 
these rules, 23andMe claims that the TOS require an arbitrator to decide arbitrability. 
In recent years, case law has developed regarding how courts should determine if questions 
of arbitrability should go to an arbitrator.  The default rule is that courts adjudicate arbitrability: 
“Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”  AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.  
“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] 
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and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”  Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944 (citation omitted).  
However, parties can agree to arbitrate arbitrability through a so-called delegation provision in a 
contract.  “The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the 
arbitration agreement.”  Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68.   
More specifically, an arbitration agreement can incorporate a delegation provision by 
referencing separate arbitration rules that provide for delegation.  Generally, when the contracting 
parties are commercial entities, incorporation of AAA rules in an arbitration agreement constitutes 
“clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended to arbitrate arbitrability because—as 
explained above—Rule R-7(a) of the Commercial Arbitration Rules transfers that responsibility to 
the arbitrator.  E.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005). 
However, Plaintiffs advocate a different result in the consumer context.  Plaintiffs contend 
that “nearly all” cases finding that an arbitrator must decide arbitrability as a result of the AAA 
rules “involve transactions between sophisticated commercial entities,” while none involves “a 
consumer who has no understanding of the ‘rules and auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association.’”  Opp’n at 13-14.  Plaintiffs also point out that the arbitration provision lacks an 
express delegation provision on its face, so a consumer would have to look up the AAA rules to 
find Rule R-7(a).  See id. at 10.  In response, 23andMe argues that there is no recognized exception 
for consumers.  See Reply at 3.   
In this case, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a bare reference to the AAA rules in 
23andMe’s online contract does not show that the parties clearly and unmistakably intended to 
delegate arbitrability.  Less than a year ago, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the principle of 
incorporating a delegation provision by citing third-party arbitration rules may not apply to 
consumers.  In Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
question of whether incorporation of the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law) arbitration rules served to delegate arbitrability.  724 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2013).  Noting that this was “an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit,” the court surveyed 
other Circuits’ holdings regarding incorporation of both the UNCITRAL and AAA rules, and 
concluded that incorporation in the contract at issue was effective.  Id. at 1073-75.  However, 
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Oracle expressly limited its holding: “We hold that as long as an arbitration agreement is between 
sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, those parties shall be expected to understand that 
incorporation of the UNCITRAL rules delegates questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”  Id. at 
1075.  Moreover, the court stated: “We express no view as to the effect of incorporating arbitration 
rules into consumer contracts.”  Id. at 1075 n.2.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that 
incorporation of arbitration rules shows “clear and unmistakable evidence” of an agreement to 
delegate arbitrability when consumers are involved. 
There is good reason not to extend this doctrine from commercial contracts between 
sophisticated parties to online click-through agreements crafted for consumers.  While 
incorporation by reference is generally permissible under ordinary contract principles, see Williams 
Constr. Co. v. Standard-Pacific Corp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 442, 454 (1967), incorporation of the 
AAA rules does not necessarily amount to “clear and unmistakable” evidence of delegation, 
particularly when the party asked to accept the agreement is a consumer.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court held that by default, courts should decide arbitrability because the question of “who 
(primarily) should decide arbitrability” is “rather arcane,” and “[a] party often might not focus 
upon that question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own 
powers.”  Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 945.  The “clear and unmistakable” test thus established a 
“heightened standard” to evince delegation.  Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 69 n.1.4     
The California Court of Appeal has expressed strong doubts about whether mere reference 
to AAA rules provides adequate notice to an individual employee: “In our view, while the 
incorporation of AAA rules into an agreement might be sufficient indication of the parties’ intent 
in other contexts, we seriously question how it provides clear and unmistakable evidence that an 
employer and an employee intended to submit the issue of the unconscionability of the arbitration 
provision to the arbitrator, as opposed to the court.”  Ajamian, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 790.  Moreover, 
                                                          
4  The Supreme Court has not decided whether incorporation by reference of the AAA rules 
always meets this heightened standard.  In Rent-A-Center, the employment arbitration agreement 
contained an express delegation provision, and the parties did not dispute the existence of the 
delegation provision.  Therefore, Rent-A-Center did not address whether invocation of AAA rules 
effectively incorporates a delegation provision by reference, or whether such a provision would 
bind consumers. 
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“[t]here are many reasons for stating that the arbitration will proceed by particular rules, and doing 
so does not indicate that the parties’ motivation was to announce who would decide threshold 
issues of enforceability.”  Id.; see also Patterson, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1666 (“While [the National 
Arbitration Forum]’s rules and fees might be fairly applied to business entities or sophisticated 
investors and to claims for substantial dollar amounts, those same procedures become oppressive 
when applied to unsophisticated borrowers of limited means in disputes over small claims.”); A & 
M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489 (1982) (noting that businessmen 
generally have “substantially more economic muscle than the ordinary consumer”).  Although 
California law regarding arbitrability does not control here, the Court finds this reasoning 
persuasive in the current context, particularly because California courts have indicated that 
California and federal arbitrability law are congruent.  See supra n.3. 
In other contexts, courts have required specificity when incorporating external arbitration 
rules to ensure adequate notice.  For example, at least one other court in this district has refused to 
apply Rule R-7(a) in a case involving franchise agreements where the “agreements themselves do 
not quote this portion of Rule 7, nor do they even refer specifically to Rule 7.”  Moody v. Metal 
Supermarket Franchising Am., Inc., No. 13-CV-5098-PJH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31440, at *10 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014).  The Moody Court determined that a reference to the “then current 
commercial arbitration rules of the AAA” was insufficient evidence of “clear and unmistakable” 
intent to delegate arbitrability, contrasting this language with an express delegation provision.  Id. 
at *11.5   
In addition, a generic reference to the AAA rules does not necessarily incorporate all future 
versions of the rules.  In Gilbert Street Developers, LLC v. La Quinta Homes, LLC, the disputed 
arbitration agreement incorporated the AAA rules, but the AAA rule delegating arbitrability did not 
exist when the agreement was signed.  174 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1189 (2009).  The court refused to 
                                                          
5  Other courts in this district have analyzed this issue in different ways.  See Bernal v. Sw. & 
Pac. Specialty Fin., Inc., No. 12-CV-05797-SBA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63338, at *14 (enforcing 
Rule R-7(a) in an online loan agreement); Crook v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., No. 13-
CV-03669-WHO, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160705, at *4, 16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013) (same, in a 
time share agreement); Kimble v. Rhodes Coll., Inc., No. 10-CV-05786-EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 59628, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (same, in a college enrollment agreement). 
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enforce the delegation provision because the agreement merely incorporated “the possibility of a 
future rule by reference.”  Id. at 1193-94.  Thus, courts have recognized that a plain recitation of 
the AAA rules does not always suffice to delegate arbitrability, even between relatively 
sophisticated parties. 
Returning to the facts here, 23andMe’s arbitration provision does not amount to clear and 
unmistakable evidence of delegation.  The agreement states only that “[a]ny Disputes shall be 
resolved by final and binding arbitration under the rules and auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association.”  TOS § 28b.  As explained above, 23andMe’s website provided minimal notice of the 
TOS to customers.  Critically, the arbitration provision contains no express delegation language, 
and its mention of the “rules and auspices” of the AAA creates multiple ambiguities about which 
rules ultimately apply.  This language forces a customer to comprehend the import of the “rules 
and auspices” of the AAA; locate those rules independently; determine that the AAA’s 
Commercial Rules apply by operation of Rule R-1(a); and then specifically identify Rule R-7(a) to 
learn of the delegation provision.  The possibility that the Consumer Rules might also apply creates 
an additional ambiguity.  The problem is further compounded by the fact that the TOS purport to 
bind users who are never asked to view the TOS and click “I ACCEPT.”  For example, as noted 
above, the TOS purport also to bind users who merely visit 23andMe’s website even if the user 
lacks an account.  See TOS §§ 1, 2, (states that users accept by “actually using the Services,” and 
defining “Services” to include use of the website “regardless if the use is in connection with an 
account or not”). 
If it wanted to avoid any doubt about delegation, 23andMe certainly could have included 
explicit delegation language, or simply reproduced or cited Rule R-7(a).  For example, in Rent-A-
Center, the disputed arbitration agreement had an express delegation clause that stated: “‘[t]he 
Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to 
resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this 
Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or 
voidable.’”  561 U.S. at 66.  Although case law holds in the commercial context that express 
language is not required for the AAA’s delegation rules to take effect, Oracle declined to extend 
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this result to consumers.  23andMe’s arbitration provision does not refer to Rule R-7(a), or even a 
specific version of the Commercial Rules (as opposed to numerous other AAA rulesets).  See 
Moody, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31440, at *10 (finding no delegation even where agreement 
referred to “then current commercial” rules).  Therefore, nothing puts consumers on notice that 
such a vague reference in the arbitration provision demonstrates their “clear and unmistakable” 
intent to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator.  
Some jurisdictions have held that incorporation of the AAA rules in a consumer arbitration 
agreement satisfies the “clear and unmistakable” test for a delegation provision.  In Fallo v. High-
Tech Institute, students sued their for-profit vocational school, which sought to enforce an 
arbitration agreement that incorporated the AAA Commercial Rules.  559 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 
2009).  The Eighth Circuit held that reference to the AAA rules effectively incorporated Rule R-
7(a)’s delegation provision.  Id. at 878.  However, Fallo is not binding authority and was decided 
before the Ninth Circuit’s Oracle decision.  Moreover, in Oracle, the Ninth Circuit cited Fallo 
when surveying authority from other Circuits; nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow 
Fallo and declined to extend the Oracle holding to consumers.  See 724 F.3d at 1074.  If the Ninth 
Circuit had found Fallo dispositive in the consumer context, the Ninth Circuit would not have left 
open the question of whether incorporation of AAA rules delegates arbitrability to an arbitrator.  
Id. at 1075 n.2. 
23andMe argues that two of this Court’s previous decisions compelling arbitration of 
arbitrability control the outcome here.  See Mot. at 7.  However, neither case involved consumer 
contracts, and both pre-date Oracle.  In Guidewire Software, Inc. v. Chookaszian, this Court 
addressed an arbitration clause in a letter agreement for a corporate board member to purchase 
stock options, finding a delegation provision incorporated by reference.  No. 12-CV-03224-LHK, 
2012 WL 5379589 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012).  In reaching its holding, this Court relied exclusively 
on precedent involving arbitration agreements in commercial contract disputes.  See id. at *4.  In 
Yahoo! Inc. v. Iversen, this Court held that an employment agreement’s reference to “the then 
current American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) National Rules for the Resolution of 
Employment Disputes” effectively incorporated a delegation provision requiring an arbitrator to 
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decide arbitrability.  836 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  Guidewire and Yahoo! did not 
address the consumer context and were issued before the Ninth Circuit in Oracle explicitly left 
open the question of whether the principle that incorporation of AAA rules “clearly and 
unmistakably” delegates arbitrability to an arbitrator should apply to consumers.   
For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines in this case that 23andMe’s arbitration 
provision fails to provide clear and unmistakable proof that the parties agreed to delegate 
arbitrability.  Because the purported delegation provision is ineffective, the Court need not reach 
the parties’ remaining arguments regarding the delegation provision.  Accordingly, the Court must 
decide questions of arbitrability. 
 3.  Unconscionability 
Plaintiffs’ remaining defense to arbitration is that the arbitration provision is 
unconscionable under California law.  See Opp’n at 18-24.  As explained above, California 
contract law governs such defenses to arbitration agreements.6  “[T]he core concern of 
unconscionability doctrine is the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”  Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1145 (2013) (quotations and citations omitted).  
“[T]he party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscion-
ability.”  Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223, 236 
(2012).  For unconscionability, California requires a showing of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, balanced on a sliding scale.  See Patterson, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1664 (noting 
analytical approaches to unconscionability).  The Court examines both prongs of unconscionability 
and determines that overall, the arbitration provision is not unconscionable. 
As an initial matter, 23andMe claims that any TOS provisions outside the arbitration 
provision are irrelevant to unconscionability because they are not part of the arbitration provision 
itself.  See Reply at 6; Mot. at 10.  The Supreme Court has held that “unless the challenge is to the 
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first 
                                                          
6  There are multiple cases pending before the California Supreme Court that may affect 
California’s law on enforceability of arbitration agreements.  See Tiri, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 243 n.6. 
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instance.”  Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006); see also Rent-
A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71 (“we nonetheless require the basis of challenge to be directed specifically 
to the agreement to arbitrate before the court will intervene”).  California has followed this 
principle, requiring “a focused challenge to the arbitration provision.”  Phillips v. Sprint PCS, 209 
Cal. App. 4th 758, 774 (2012).  Accordingly, the Court considers only arguments that apply to the 
arbitration provision. 
  a.  Procedural Unconscionability 
Plaintiffs contend that the arbitration provision is procedurally defective because it is buried 
at the end of the TOS, 23andMe did not provide customers a copy of the AAA rules, and the TOS 
give 23andMe the ability to modify the terms unilaterally.  See Opp’n at 19-20.  23andMe 
disagrees, arguing that the arbitration provision “was not hidden or difficult to understand,” and 
that customers had a choice of other DNA services.  Reply at 8-10.  After weighing these 
arguments, the Court concludes that the provision is procedurally unconscionable. 
“Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of 
adhesion.”   Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113.  An adhesive contract “signifies a standardized 
contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the 
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
“If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine whether other factors are present which, 
under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it unenforceable.”  Id. 
(quotation and citation omitted).  California courts also examine the factors of “surprise” and 
“oppression.”  “The procedural element of unconscionability . . . focuses on two factors: 
oppression and surprise.  Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in 
no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.  Surprise involves the extent to which the 
supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the 
party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”  Tiri, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 245 (quotations and 
citations omitted); see also id. at 245 n.8 (noting interplay of adhesion and unconscionability).   
Under California law, 23andMe’s arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable.  As 
explained above, 23andMe’s website provides minimal notice of the TOS to customers.  Under the 
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TOS, the arbitration provision supposedly binds any user who visits 23andMe’s website or 
purchases a DNA kit—even though the website does not require those users to acknowledge the 
TOS.  Customers who purchase DNA kits have only a 60-minute window to cancel their orders and 
receive a full refund.  By the time those customers create accounts and register their DNA kits—
when 23andMe first requires them to acknowledge the arbitration provision—they have already 
paid 23andMe, and the cancellation period may have long expired.  Furthermore, even if customers 
locate and click a hyperlink to the TOS, they must hunt for the arbitration provision because the 
terms appear at the very end of the TOS as a subparagraph to the final section titled 
“Miscellaneous.”  See TOS § 28.  A customer who notices the provision’s reference to the “rules 
and auspices of the American Arbitration Association” must still determine the scope of the 
provision by searching for those rules, ascertain that the Commercial Rules apply, determine that 
the Consumer Rules may or may not apply (depending on the AAA’s discretion), and identify any 
objectionable provisions.  This opaque arrangement undermines 23andMe’s characterization of the 
arbitration provision as “not hidden or difficult to understand.” 
These facts render the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable.  The arbitration 
provision is a contract of adhesion because it is a standardized clause drafted by 23andMe (who has 
superior bargaining strength relative to consumers) and presented as a take-it-or-leave-it 
agreement, giving consumers no opportunity to negotiate any terms.  See Gutierrez v. Autowest, 
Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 89 (2003) (finding similar terms in consumer car leases indicative of 
adhesion).  The arbitration provision also involves substantial surprise and oppression.  Customers 
received minimal notice of the arbitration provision, and only after handing over their money.  
Where an arbitration provision is part of a larger contract, California courts have relied on the 
degree of notice surrounding the contract to assess the procedural unconscionability of the 
arbitration provision.  E.g., Ajamian, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 796 (“The finding that the arbitration 
provision was part of a nonnegotiated employment agreement establishes, by itself, some degree of 
procedural unconscionability.” (emphasis added)).   
23andMe’s arguments are unconvincing.  23andMe contends that the arbitration provision 
cannot be procedurally unconscionable because the named Plaintiffs actually agreed to the TOS.  
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See Reply at 8-9.  This conflates the requirements for contract formation with the question of 
unconscionability.  “A contract term may be held to be unconscionable even if the weaker party 
knowingly agreed to it.”  Bruni v. Didion, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1289 (2008) (overruled on other 
grounds).  If 23andMe were correct that notice is “legally irrelevant” to procedural unconscion-
ability when the customer in fact agrees (Reply at 8), then no disputed agreement could ever be 
procedurally unconscionable.  Next, 23andMe claims Plaintiffs “had meaningful market 
alternatives” because there are other DNA testing services.  Id. at 8 & n.11.  However, the court in 
Gutierrez rejected a similar argument that “alternative sources of vehicles were available” because 
“no evidence was introduced below that other dealers offered automobile lease contracts without 
similar arbitration provisions.”  114 Cal. App. 4th at 89 n.8 (emphasis added); see also Dean 
Witter Reynolds v. Sup. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 772 (1989) (referring to “reasonably available 
alternative sources of supply from which to obtain the desired goods and services free of the terms 
claimed to be unconscionable” (emphasis added)).  23andMe has not shown that the available 
alternative services did not also mandate arbitration. 
The parties’ remaining arguments provide little guidance here.  Plaintiffs claim that 
23andMe’s failure to provide the AAA rules contributes to procedural unconscionability.  See 
Opp’n at 20.  However, California courts are divided on this issue.  See Lane v. Francis Capital 
Mgmt. LLC, 224 Cal. App. 4th 676, 690-92 (2014) (collecting cases); Tiri, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 246 
n.9 (declining to resolve “whether the failure to attach the AAA rules supports a finding of 
procedural unconscionability”).  Plaintiffs also note that Sections 26 and 28h of the TOS allow 
23andMe to unilaterally modify the arbitration provision.  See Opp’n at 20.  Because those 
provisions are not specific to arbitration, an arbitrator should address them.  See Phillips, 209 Cal. 
App. 4th at 774.  Even setting aside these arguments, the Court concludes that the arbitration 
provision was procedurally unconscionable. 
  b.  Substantive Unconscionability 
The arbitration provision must also be substantively unconscionable to be deemed 
unenforceable.  Substantive unconscionability arises when a provision is so “overly harsh or one-
sided” that it falls outside the “reasonable expectations” of the non-drafting party.  See Gutierrez, 
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114 Cal. App. 4th at 88 (quoting Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113-14).  It is not enough that the 
terms are slightly one-sided or confer more benefits on a particular party; a substantively 
unconscionable term must be so unreasonable and one-sided as to “shock the conscience.”  Am. 
Software, Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1391 (1996); see also Malone v. Sup. Ct., No. 
B253891, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 524, at *13-14 (June 17, 2014).  The Court finds that, although 
Plaintiffs have established substantial procedural unconscionability, the terms of the arbitration 
provision as a whole are not substantively unconscionable.  
Plaintiffs focus on five arguments: the choice of 23andMe’s headquarters (San Francisco) 
as the arbitration forum; a carve out for any claims by 23andMe, including intellectual property 
claims; a shortened statute of limitations; 23andMe’s right to alter or terminate the arbitration 
provision without consent or notice; and limitations on the legal remedies available to consumers.  
See Opp’n at 22-23.  The Court addresses these in turn and finds that the terms are not so unduly 
harsh or one-sided that they are substantively unconscionable.  
Forum selection: The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that the choice of San 
Francisco, California places too heavy a burden on consumers.  The Ninth Circuit has held that 
requiring arbitration “at the location of a defendant’s principal place of business” is “presumptively 
enforceable.”  Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Sys., Inc., 623 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2010).  California 
courts have also held that a forum selection clause should be given effect so long as the choice is 
reasonable and has “some logical nexus to one of the parties or the dispute.”  Am. Online, Inc. v. 
Sup. Ct., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11-12 (2001) (confirming that “California favors contractual forum 
selection clauses so long as they are entered into freely and voluntarily, and their enforcement 
would not be unreasonable”); see also Intershop Commc’ns, AG v. Sup. Ct., 104 Cal. App. 4th 191, 
196 (2002).  Here, 23andMe is headquartered in Northern California.  Although Plaintiffs are a 
dispersed putative class from across the country who purchased PGS online, they have failed to 
prove that arbitrating in San Francisco “will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the 
resisting party will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 
at 632.  Forum selection clauses are ubiquitous in online contracts and have the economic benefits 
of “favoring both merchants and consumers, including reduction in the costs of goods and services 
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and the stimulation of e-commerce.”  Am. Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 12.  Additionally, Plaintiffs 
filed six of the nine related cases in California and voluntarily transferred all cases to San Jose, 
California.  Other plaintiffs with similar claims initiated three arbitration proceedings with the 
AAA in San Francisco.  The fact that numerous plaintiffs chose to assert their claims in Northern 
California suggests that the stated forum is not overly burdensome or unreasonable.   
Plaintiffs rely on Comb v. PayPal Inc. to contest the forum-selection clause.  218 F. Supp. 
2d at 1177.  PayPal involved a substantively unconscionable contract that mandated arbitration in 
Santa Clara County, California.  However, the court cited forum selection as only one among 
multiple factors that contributed to substantive unconscionability (including the inability of 
customers to join or consolidate their claims, which is not at issue here), while acknowledging that 
“forum selection clauses generally are presumed prima facie valid” under California law.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs there also presented specific information regarding the costs of arbitration.  See id. at 
1176.  In this case, given the presumption that forum selection clauses are enforceable, the reality 
that multiple claims may require arbitration in a common location, and the lack of specific 
evidence regarding Plaintiffs’ likely costs of arbitrating in San Francisco (particularly relative to 
the costs of litigating in federal court in San Jose), the Court cannot say that San Francisco lacks 
any “logical nexus to one of the parties or the dispute.”  Am. Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 12; see 
also King v. Hausfeld, No. 13-CV-00237-EMC, 2013 WL 1435288, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 
2013) (“Given the location of the firm’s headquarters, there is a rational basis for selecting a 
Washington, D.C. forum.”).  
Restrictions on claims: Plaintiffs’ second assertion—that the arbitration restrictions do not 
apply to any claims by 23andMe—is unavailing.  Plaintiffs posit that the phrase “any disputes with 
23andMe” includes only claims against 23andMe, so that 23andMe’s affirmative claims are not 
subject to arbitration.  This argument is baseless.  The arbitration provision plainly applies equally 
to both parties, and 23andMe does not take the position that this clause is a one-way street.  See, 
e.g., Bigler v. Harker Sch., 213 Cal. App. 4th 727, 737-38 (2013) (rejecting argument that “‘any 
dispute involving the School’” was a nonmutual restriction).  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the 
arbitration provision is distinguishable from the improper agreement in Armendariz that exempted 
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claims by an employer.  See 24 Cal. 4th at 92, 120 (“I agree as a condition of my employment, that 
in the event my employment is terminated, and I contend that such termination was wrongful . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs also argue that the exclusion for intellectual property disputes 
(“Except for any disputes relating to intellectual property disputes”) unfairly favors 23andMe.  As 
explained above, the TOS allows consumers to retain certain intellectual property rights to their 
genetic and self-reported information.  See TOS §§ 9, 13.  Therefore, consumers may avail 
themselves of the carve out for intellectual property disputes. 
Limitations period and unilateral modification: Plaintiffs’ third and fourth arguments 
depend on contract provisions outside the arbitration provision: the one-year limitations period 
(TOS § 28d), and 23andMe’s ability to “modify, supplement or replace” the terms unilaterally 
(TOS §§ 26, 28h).  However, these provisions are separate from the arbitration provision, and 
Plaintiffs have not shown how those clauses specifically render the arbitration provision 
substantively unconscionable.  See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46; Phillips, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 774. 
Fees and costs: Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the agreement unfairly restricts consumers’ 
available remedies because of a fee-shifting provision.  See TOS § 28b (“with arbitration costs and 
reasonable documented attorneys’ costs of both parties to be borne by the party that ultimately 
loses”).  Plaintiffs argue that this “loser pays” provision disproportionately affects Plaintiffs’ costs 
of arbitration.  However, 23andMe represents that it has formally waived any right to recover 
attorneys’ fees and costs at the request of the AAA.  See Reply at 11.7  Accordingly, the Court 
declines to consider whether or not this provision is substantively unconscionable. 
The Court has considered the parties’ remaining arguments and identifies no additional 
basis for substantive unconscionability.  Plaintiffs challenge the costs of arbitration and the fairness 
of AAA discovery rules.  See Opp’n at 21; Reply at 11-12.  For purposes of this motion, the Court 
accepts Plaintiffs’ assertion that the filing fee is $975 under the AAA Commercial Rules.  
However, Plaintiffs fail to show that this fee “shocks the conscience,” particularly relative to 
                                                          
7  A district court has found that as long as fee-shifting provisions apply equally to both 
parties, as is the case here, the term is enforceable.  See King, 2013 WL 1435288, at *18 (“[T]he 
point of a fee shifting clause is that if Plaintiff’s claim proves meritorious, his fees would be 
reimbursed by Defendant. The clause could thus facilitate his ability to vindicate his rights.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
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litigation expenses.  Rather, Plaintiffs rely on cases where arbitration fees were orders of 
magnitude higher.  See Gutierrez, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 89-91 (administrative fee of $8,000 
exceeded plaintiffs’ ability to pay); Parada, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 1581 (“To arbitrate a claim, each 
party thus would have to pay at least $20,800, and would have to deposit that amount before the 
arbitration hearing.”).  Plaintiffs also fail to show that any discovery limitations would impose a 
great hardship here.  See Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Cal., 83 Cal. App. 4th 677, 
689 (2000) (“We are not aware of any case that has ever held that an arbitration provision is 
substantially unconscionable merely because a party’s discovery rights are limited in arbitration.”).  
Additionally, Plaintiffs suggest that the delegation provision incorporated from Rule R-7(a) is 
substantively unconscionable under California law.  See Opp’n at 7-8.  Plaintiffs rely on two 
California cases that rejected arbitration agreements as unconscionable to the extent they purported 
to delegate arbitrability via incorporation of the AAA rules.  See Murphy v. Check ‘N Go of Cal., 
Inc., 156 Cal. App. 4th 138, 145 (2007); Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 
494, 508 (2008).  To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the delegation provision contributes to the 
unconscionability of the entire arbitration provision, those arguments are misplaced.  The 
California Court of Appeal has recently acknowledged that intervening Supreme Court precedent 
has overruled Murphy and Ontiveros.  See Tiri, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 248-49; Malone, 2014 Cal. 
App. LEXIS 524, at *32-33. 
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision is not substantively 
unconscionable.  Therefore, while the arbitration provision is procedurally defective, Plaintiffs 
have not met their burden to demonstrate that the provision is both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable, as California law requires.  Accordingly, the Court enforces the arbitration 
provision and grants 23andMe’s motion. 
C. Stay or Dismiss 
When arbitration is mandatory, courts have discretion to stay the case under 9 U.S.C. § 3 or 
dismiss the litigation entirely.  See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 
1988); see also Hopkins & Carley, ALC v. Thomson Elite, No. 10-CV-05806-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38396, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2011) (“Where an arbitration clause is broad enough to 
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cover all of a plaintiff’s claims, the court may compel arbitration and dismiss the action.”).  
23andMe has requested dismissal of all claims and does not object to Plaintiffs joining the existing 
arbitration proceedings.  See Mot. at 11-12.  Plaintiffs are silent as to whether a stay or dismissal 
would be appropriate. 
This Court has previously stayed litigation pending arbitration—instead of dismissing—by 
agreement of the parties in light of potential concerns about statutes of limitation.  Hopkins & 
Carley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38396, at *28-29.  Because the parties have identified no such 
concerns here, and dismissal would render this decision immediately appealable (see MediVas, 
LLC v. Marubeni Corp., 741 F.3d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n order compelling arbitration may be 
appealed if the district court dismisses all the underlying claims, but may not be appealed if the 
court stays the action pending arbitration.”)), the Court concludes that dismissal is appropriate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration 
and dismisses all claims without prejudice.  The Clerk shall close the following case files: Nos. 
5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 5:14-CV-00294-LHK, 5:14-CV-00429-LHK, 5:14-CV-01167-LHK, 5:14-
CV-01191-LHK, 5:14-CV-01258-LHK, 5:14-CV-01348-LHK, and 5:14-CV-01455-LHK. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 25, 2014     _________________________________ 
 LUCY H. KOH 
 United States District Judge  
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